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 China’s industrial policy fosters
collusion
China’s economic growth is often attributed to
the rapid proliferation of special economic
zones (SEZ). New research suggests that
gains to ﬁrms arising from the preferential tax
and regulatory incentives for locating inside
an SEZ, may come at a cost to consumers.
Clustering may equally promote competition
and collusion among ﬁrms in SEZs; could
beneﬁts from collusion outweigh the costs?
The Chinese economic miracle of the past few decades is
perhaps the most important and dramatic economic growth
episode in recent history. It has moved an estimated 750 million
people out of extreme poverty.
Many economists and policymakers attribute the start of the
Chinese economic miracle of the past few decades to the
founding of “Special Economic Zones” – special areas in which
markets, international trade, and innovation are promoted
through public-private cooperation and a variety of tax,
regulatory, and infrastructure incentives.  In the early 2000s,
India followed suit, proliferating similar zones in the hopes that
they would lead to economic growth and development. Other
countries, both developing and advanced, have adopted similar
strategies.
Collusion among ﬁrms is higher inside the economic zones
Our recent research, however, has uncovered a potential dark
side of these zones: they promote collusion.  Focusing on China,
our index of collusion is four times as high in the Special
Economic Zones (SEZs) we study as it is outside of the zones.
 In addition, we find high rates of collusion in certain other
industrial clusters, even those not designated SEZs. Current
research is investigating whether impacts in India are similar.
Our collusion index is based on a tool that we develop and
validate to measure rates of price collusion among subgroups of
firms in the same disaggregated industry.  The test builds off of
a simple idea: independently competing firms consider the
impact of price behavior on their own market share, but
colluding firms also consider the impact of lower prices on the
market shares of other colluding firms. One way we validate the
test is by showing that it can identify correctly which firms (in
this case plants) are colluding with each other, and which
aren’t.  We do this by examining plants owned by the same
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aren’t.  We do this by examining plants owned by the same
parent firm, which collude with each other in much stronger
fashion than plants owned by different parent firms.
Proximity within a zone naturally increases interaction and
mechanisms for collusion
The zones are meant to attract and agglomerate businesses.  We
conjecture that firms who are closer to one another are more
likely to interact in a number of ways.  Informally, increased
interaction may allow for greater trust, easier communication,
and easier monitoring. Formally, industry boards and
associations and coordinated marketing venues are often part of
the policies.
“Countries are often happy to have firms collude in the export
market, however, because the costs are born by foreign
consumers, while benefits accrue to the domestic economy. “
In an interview, one firm leader in China acknowledged that the
members of the local industrial association have an agreement
to not compete on price. Instead, the industry association leader
receives contracts, and allocates the business among the
member firms.  The railroad cartel in the 19  century U.S.
began with the forming of an industry association as well.  We
don’t rely on anecdotal evidence or even case studies, but the
evidence supports our conjecture on the mechanisms.
Who pays the price for collusion?
In most countries around the world, collusion is discouraged if
not explicitly criminalised.  If SEZs lead to collusion, they may
be beggar-they-neighbor development policies: good for local
economies but gains are at the expense of consumers in the rest
of the country.  Countries are often happy to have firms collude
in the export market, however, because the costs are born by
foreign consumers, while benefits accrue to the domestic
economy.  Surprisingly, we find higher rates of collusion in
clusters dominated by domestic firms with lower export shares,
so it seems more likely to harm the domestic economy.
Collusion leads to inefficiently low levels of output, but it might
improve how efficiently production is allocated across the firms
in the industry.  We find evidence that colluding clusters
equalize their markups, and we show this is consistent with
more efficient allocation of production among colluding firms. 
Finally, it may be that higher profits associated with collusion
are necessary to sustain growing industries. The infant industry
argument states that young industries need protection,
especially when financial markets are underdeveloped. In that
case, allowing collusion may be an unorthodox way of
protecting the industry.
Do Special Economic Zones necessarily lead to increased
collusion?
Perhaps proper organisation of the industrial cluster or proper
oversight might eliminate the risk of collusions.  In that case,
the message is not, “Beware Special Economic Zones,” but
instead, “Be vigilant about collusion when firms are
agglomerated!”  We note that our results are not applicable to
the larger zones that began in the 1980s and introduced market
th
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the larger zones that began in the 1980s and introduced market
incentives into an otherwise planned economy. Instead, our
results focus on more local SEZs that have proliferated since.
 These zones are often industry-specific and involve land
developers.  Ongoing work will explore whether certain types
of zones are more closely associated with collusion than others.
Areas for further research: Do the pros outweigh the cons?
If collusion is bad, and inextricably tied to special economic
zones, the desirability hinges on whether the benefits outweigh
the costs.
There are several purported benefits of industrial clusters: Thick
product markets may increase sales.  In addition, labour market
pooling and thicker markets for specialised intermediates may
lower costs, and give firms greater flexibility in adjusting
production levels.
Finally, technology spillovers might improve productivity for
everyone.   This is another question of ongoing research, but it
seems clear that the typical argument in favour of clusters does
not appropriately answer this question. Proponents of cluster
policy have often pointed to higher growth or profitability
within industrial clusters. These could be driven by either the
above benefits, or by beggar-thy-neighbor collusion. Therefore,
new metrics and methods are needed to answer the question.
Collusion in other settings
We have evidence for China, but special economic zones are
common in many countries, and cluster initiatives are even
more ubiquitous.  An important question is whether the
incidence of collusion is particular to the Chinese economic
model or not.   We do not yet have the answers, but we are
currently pursuing a parallel study in India, where industrial
organisation, average firm size, cluster policies, and the role of
government more broadly are all considerably different.  A nice
advantage of our test is that it is quite portable to any country
with data that tracks firms over time.
